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shape hypothesis”, ﬁrst introduced by Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), states that countries
with highly centralized and highly decentralized wage bargaining processes have a superior
performance in terms of unemployment than countries with an intermediate degree of
centralization. Calmfors and Drifﬁll’s results were obtained on a sample including data from
1962 up to 1985. This paper shows that the claimed superiority in terms of unemployment
of centralized countries over intermediate ones during the ’60s and the ’70s depended upon
their high levels of government expenditure and public sector employment. The evidence
shows that from the beginning of the ’80s the expansion of the public sector in centralized
countries slowed down considerably and, at the same time, the correlation between the degree
of centralization and unemployment weakened. This evidence helps reconcile recent ﬁndings
of poor correlations between measures of economic performance and indexes of bargaining
systems with Calmfors and Drifﬁll’s original results. The paper concludes by questioning
the compatibility of the reported evidence with the theoretical framework proposed by CD to
explain the hump-shape hypothesis.
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controls for the aggregate demand and supply balance or measures of the government’s policy
stance. As the Scandinavian models of trade union behaviour imply, the government policy
stance may be correlated with institutional structure and behaviour.”
Flanagan (1999), page 1165
1. Introduction
1
This paper discusses the empirical relation between the degree of centralization in wage
bargaining agreements and the performance of the labour market in terms of unemployment.
Whether a signiﬁcant empirical relation can be found is a relevant issue for policy-making.
Recently, policy-makers are becoming aware of the need to introduce more
“competitiveness” in the labour market. However, competitiveness can be increased in
many ways: reducing hiring and ﬁring costs, making weekly or yearly working hours more
dependentoncompanies’needs, orelseintroducingsomechangesinwagebargainingpatterns.
If the empirical (causal) relationship between these different forms of competitiveness and
unemployment is not clear, labour market reforms may be hampered by a poor understanding
of the causes of high unemployment.
This paper focuses on the effects of the degree of centralization in wage bargaining on
the unemployment level. The degree of centralization in wage bargaining must be intended, at
a ﬁrst approximation, as the level at which the wage is set (and maybe other aspects of labour
contracts as well). Traditionally, OECD countries are divided into three groups depending on
the level at which the bargaining between unions and employers occurs: at national level, at
industry level, or at plant level.
The debate on the relation between centralization and labour market performance dates
back to the ’80s, when the so-called “corporativism” debate began. In those years, many
authors (McCallum, 1983; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986; Newell
and Symons, 1987) argued that centralized wage setting leads to more wage restraint and less
unemployment: centralized bargaining forces unions to internalize negative externalities that
1 I am solely responsible for any errors. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those
of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: forni.lorenzo@insedia.interbusiness.it10
would otherwise affect labour market outcomes; for example, plant or industry level unions
may demand high wages without internalizing the effects of their demand on the overall price
level.
This position was later revised by Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), Freeman (1988) and
more recently, among others, Hoel (1991), and Holden and Raaum (1992). They claim
that the relation between the degree of centralization and the change in the unemployment
rate is not monotonic (that is, as centralization grows, there is more wage restraint and less
unemployment) and that it has the shape of an invertedU (hence the deﬁnition of “hump-shape
hypothesis”): countries with both a very high and a very low degree of centralization have a
better performance in terms of unemployment than countries with an intermediate degree of
centralization.
2 For a recent and extensive review of this literature see Flanagan (1999).
The hump-shape hypothesis also ﬁnds support in some more recent papers: Boeri,
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) use OECD data to analyze the determinants of the employment
rate and write that “the estimated coefﬁcients for the measures of centralization/coordination
give some support to the hump-shape hypothesis (Calmfors and Drifﬁll, 1988)”
3; similar
evidence is reported by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). In a recent survey of some of the issues
related to wage bargaining institutions, Calmfors (2001) writes: “Broadly speaking, half of the
studies [reviewed] have found the relationship [between the degree of bargaining coordination
and unemployment] to be hump-shaped in line with Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988) hypothesis,
and half of the studies have found it to be monotonic (with more coordination always leading
to lower unemployment).”
4
Both the approaches mentioned, the “monotonic” and the “hump-shaped”, hold
that intermediate countries (those with industry wage bargaining) should have a worse
unemployment performance than centralized countries. In this paper I intend to discuss the
2 In the words of Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988, pg. 13): “either highly centralized systems with national
bargaining (such as in Austria and the Nordic countries) or highly decentralized systems with wage settings at the
level of individual ﬁrms (such as in Japan, Switzerland and the US) seem to perform well. The worst outcome
with respect to employment may well be found in systems with an intermediate degree of centralization (such
as in Belgium and the Netherlands).” Note that a good performance in CD language is essentially a moderate
increase in the average unemployment rate over the periods of their study, that is 1974-85 averages less 1963-73
averages.
3 Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), pg. 27.
4 Calmfors (2001), pg. 19.11
empirical robustnessof thisresult. I will follow the approach of Calmfors andDrifﬁll’s (1988),
henceforth CD, who ﬁrst introduced the hump-shape theory.
5
Thepoint ofthe paperis that, over the period considered by CD(1962-1985), centralized
countries had a higher growth in public expenditure and, to a lesser extent, a higher starting
level than other economies. Countries with high levels of public expenditures as a percentage
of GDP generally have a large share of employment in the public sector, which is less affected
than private sector employment by economic downturns. Moreover, public expenditure may
have dampened the negative effects on unemployment of the shocks of the ’70s and beginning
of the ’80s.
The claim that the empirical content of the hump-shape hypothesis is weak is not novel.
The OECD has devoted a chapter in its 1997 Employment Outlook to the empirical relation
between wage bargaining institutions and some measures of economic performance over the
period 1980-1996. After a detailed review of earlier results, the chapter discusses several
ways of testing therelationship between centralization and measures ofeconomicperformance
(among which, the unemployment rate). “To conclude, many of the statistical results show
little in the way of signiﬁcant statistical relations between measures of economic performance
and certain indices of bargaining systems, .... A key question is how one can interpret such
ﬁndings.”
6 This paper will help reconcile OECD results with previous ones, in particular those
of CD.
7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will discuss CD’s approach and results.
Section 3 will present our data and estimation strategy. Section 4 will present the results of the
analysis on the same sample period as CD (1962-1985). In section 5 the sample period will
be extended up to the year 2000. Section 6 will discuss some extensions and section 7 will
conclude.
5 Freeman (1988) reaches very similar conclusions to Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988) using a similar approach.
The only difference is that Freeman takes wage dispersion as measure of the degree of centralization in wage
bargaining whereas Calmfors and Drifﬁll use a rank based on the degree of centralization.
6 OECD Employment Outlook 1997, pg. 83.
7 To my knowledge, the only other paper that moves in the direction of reconciling OECD with CD results
is Cukierman and Lippi (1998). They suggest that, in explaining the correlation between unemployment and
centralization, a measure of Central Bank independence is a relevant variable.12
2. Calmfors and Drifﬁll’s rank and approach
CD deﬁne the degree of centralization as “the extent of inter-unions and inter-employers
cooperation in wage bargaining”.
8 The “extent of cooperation”, in CD’s analysis, is obtained
by summing two measures: the ﬁrst is the level (national, industry, plant) at which bargaining
takes place; the second is the degree of coordination among unions (that is, the number of
unions and the extent of their cooperation
9) and among employers’ federations (that is, the
number of employer federations and the extent of their cooperation).
Based on these two measures CD assign a level of centralization to 17 OECD countries.
Table 1 shows the level of centralization for each country (1= Centralized, 2= Intermediate,
3= Decentralized) used by CD and two more updated ranks based on the same criteria as CD:
the one developed by the OECD in the 1997 Employment Outlook and the one presented by
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), henceforth EMS. The OECD Employment Outlook
reports values for three years (1980, 1990 and 1994). EMS provide information on the
development of the centralization index for 19 OECD countries starting in 1980 and up to
the end of the ’90s (see Table B.2 of their paper). In Table 1 I have reported the value of
the index in three years (1980, 1990 and 1994) and, whereas the development of the degree
of centralization is described only qualitatively by EMS (i.e. index equal to 3, gradually to
1 in the ’80s), I assume the degree of centralization changes at the midpoint (in the example,
the index switches from 3 to 1 in 1986). CD’s rank is based on information available at the
beginning of the ’80s and therefore I have assigned CD’s centralization assessment of each
country to the year 1980. The two more updated ranks will be used when I extend the analysis
to the sample including data up to 2000.
In their paper, CD compute means of the unemployment rate and some macroeconomic
performance indexes over two periods (1963-73 and 1974-85). They then show that the change
of the average unemployment rate over the two periods had a hump-shaped pattern if plotted
against their rank of centralization. They further support their evidence reporting a similar
result for a macroeconomic performance index given by the sum of the unemployment rate
and the current account deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP. The motivation for this index has a
8 Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), pg 17.
9 The extent of cooperation takes values between 1 and 3 and is assigned somewhat arbitrarily by CD.13
Keynesian ﬂavour; it is based on the idea that there is a trade-off between unemployment and
external balance.
CD propose the following theoretical explanation for the hump-shaped result. Assume a
model where “each industry consists of a large number of competitive price-taking ﬁrms. Each
ﬁrm operates with a ﬁxed capital stock but can vary its labour input (with the same constant-
elasticity-of-substitution production function). The goods of various industries are imperfect
substitutes in demand for each other.”
10 The labour market is characterized by unions. Assume
prices are given by a mark-up on labour cost and that labour demand is standard, decreasing in
the wage. Given these hypotheses, the effect on unemployment of an increase in the degree of
centralization depends on the following two opposite forces: i) unions’ market power; ii) the
effects of wage increases on prices:
i) As unions get larger they acquire market power. At the ﬁrm level, workers have
little market power since an isolated increase in nominal wages would result in a large fall in
employment for that ﬁrm: a single ﬁrm is unable to raise its output price unless all ﬁrms in the
same industry do so. However, if the union were to control the labour supply to all ﬁrms within
the industry, an increase in nominal wages would lead to an increase in the output price for
the whole industry. Assuming the price elasticity of demand to be lower for goods produced
by different industries than for goods of the same industry, the elasticity of demand for labour
with respect to the wage would be lower if the union were to control labour supply at the
industry level rather than at the ﬁrm level. That is, an industry union has more market power
than a plant-level union and therefore on average gets higher nominal wages. This argument
can be extended to support the idea that nominal wages tend to become progressively higher as
unions encompass more sectors. The larger union enjoys a lower total nominal wage elasticity
of demand for its labour than do the constituent members, since a given nominal wage increase
results in a larger output price rise.
ii) However, the effect of nominal wages on the aggregate price level provides an
opposite incentive. Nominal wage increases achieved by small unions have only small effects
on the consumption price level (a single ﬁrm is forced to adjust the quantities more than the
prices), so that real wages rise by approximately the same amount as nominal wages. As
unions become larger the effect of nominal wages on the price level increases and the real
10 Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), pg. 31.14
wage gain of a given nominal wage increase is reduced. The larger the union, the more it will
internalize this moderating effect.
Increased centralization, in CD’s opinion, thus produces two opposite effects on wages.
The net effect can go in either direction and is likely to be hump-shaped if consumers’ demand
elasticities of substitution are larger at lower levels of aggregation.
3. Econometric speciﬁcation
CD analyze the correlation between the centralization rank and the rank based on the
change in the mean unemployment rate (over the two periods 1963-73 and 1974-85).
11 Since
the correlation is signiﬁcant, they claim the change in the mean of the unemployment rate
depends on the degree of centralization. They do not control for other variables.
12
In this paper I show that over the sample period countries with a high degree of
centralization have had a higher growth in public expenditure as a percentage of GDP;
this growth in expenditure has been accompanied by a marked increase in public sector
employment. Whileto someextentthegrowthin publicexpenditurehasbeen ageneralpattern,
countries with less centralized wage bargaining have observed a much more moderate increase
in public sector employment.
Figure 1 shows the development of the mean (population weighted) unemployment
rate grouping the countries by CD’s index of centralization. The vertical line is set at 1986
to show visually where the sample period considered by CD ends. The Figure shows the
marked increase in the unemployment rate during the ’70s and beginning of the ’80s in
11 To test directly the hump-shape hypothesis, CD develop a revised centralization ranking in which both
very centralized and very decentralized economies rank above the intermediate ones.
12 In fact, CD’s theoretical framework explains the correlation between the degree of centralization and the
level of wages or - for a standard downward sloping labour demand curve - the level of employment. However,
it is the correlation between centralization and changes in the unemployment rate that is signiﬁcant, not the one
between centralization and the level of the unemployment rate. In order to explain this fact, CD propose the
following argument. During the ’60s and the beginning of the ’70s most countries in the sample were in full em-
ployment: labour demand was so strong as to allow unions to obtain high real wages and full employment. After
the oil shocks of the ’70s, labuor demand decreased substantially; at the new lower level, unions accepted some
unemployment (or an employment level below potential) in order to support real wages. Since most countries
were in full employment before the oil shocks, these shocks had a different effect on unemployment depending
on the country’s wage bargaining structure. This explanation is consistent with the model (1) below that I take as
a reference for the empirical analysis.15
intermediate economies; centralized and decentralized countries, while starting off from rather
different levels, show a similar increase up to 1985. It must be stressed that the dynamic
of the unemployment rate changes dramatically for the three groups of countries after 1985:
centralized countries (still based on CD rank) show a marked increase in the unemployment
rate.
Figure 2 shows the (population weighted) mean by centralization of the number of
public employees as a share of total population (EG), of public employee compensations
as a share of GDP (CGW) and of total current government expenditure as a percentage
of GDP (YPG ). The Figure reveals the diverging dynamics of public employment versus
employee compensations in centralized countries. That is, in these countries the growth in
compensations has been accompanied by a more than proportional increase in the number of
public employees. Both employee compensations and total current government expenditure
have grown more rapidly in centralized than in other countries, especially before 1985.
3.1 A preliminary analysis
The data presented suggest that the hump-shaped relation may reﬂect the correlation
between the degree of centralization and the growth in public employment. A preliminary
way to assess this hypothesis is to check the correlation between the degree of centralization
and a measure of employment which does not consider public employment. I therefore
subtract public employment from total employment in order to deﬁne a “private sector”
employment rate (PS_EMP_R). I then regress by OLS the change in both the employment
rate (EMP_R) and the “private sector” employment rate on three centralization dummies
(centralized, intermediate, decentralized) and plot the smoothed ﬁtted values from the two
regressions in Figure 3. I use data from the OECD 2001 Economic Outlook panel data set
13
and consider the same time period (1962-1985) and the same grouping by centralization of the
seventeen countries as CD. To limit the effect of the cycle on the estimates, for all variables
I take means over six-year periods starting from 1962 and up to 1985.
14 I therefore consider
four six-year periods.
13 OECD deﬁnitions follow the 1995 System of National Accounts when possible. For a description of the
variables and summary statistics of the data see the Data Appendix.
14 Note that generally government expenditure is not signiﬁcantly affected by economic cycles, or not as
much as revenue is.16
The dummies are all signiﬁcant and the dummies for centralized countries are
statistically different from the ones for intermediate countries in both regressions. From
the Figure it emerges that countries with intermediate degrees of centralization experienced
a greater average reduction in total employment than other countries (and in particular than
centralized countries); there is no such evidence for “private sector” employment.
This evidence, although suggesting a possible weakness of the hump-shape theory, can
not be considered conclusive. The main reason is that, although the theory proposed by CD is
mainly a market-based explanation, it does not distinguish between private and public sector
(consider, for example, that the centralization indexes are computed to include the public
sector). After all, the labour demand is negatively sloped in the public sector as well (for
evidence on this see, for example, Gregory and Borland, 1999) and therefore a higher degree
of centralization may induce wage moderation and more employment in the public sector too.
If this is the case, there is no reason to considerpublic employment separately. In the following
I will argue that centralized countries have had a higher starting level and a higher growth rate,
not only of public employees but also of total public expenditure, and that this higher level
of public intervention has had a signiﬁcant effect on the overall employment performance of
these countries.
3.2 As i m p l ef r a m e w o r k
In the following I propose a simple model to capture the effect of public expenditure
on the unemployment rate. Assume that changes in unemployment depend on how different
labour market institutions respond to exogenous shocks (such as the oil shocks of the ’70s)
and that such response depends also on the level of government intervention in the economy.
That is:
DUNRit =( γDCi + Xitδ)ηt + εit (1)
where DUNR is the change in the Total Unemployment Rate, DC i st h ed e g r e eo f
centralization, X is the level of government intervention (i.e. government expenditure) and
ηt is the exogenous shock in period t. In order to limit the effects of cyclical factors on the
variables, I take six-year averages of the variables.
15 This approach follows CD’s type of
15 I also experimented taking means over longer and shorter periods of time with minor differences in the17
analysis. Expressing the variables as means over periods of six-year - the subscript t
 refers to
the six-year periods - expression (1) can be written as follows:
DUNRit = h γDCi + Xith δ + εit (2)
where I assume that ηt = η (that is, constant across t

) so that h γ = γη and h δ = δη.
16
Public expenditure affects both the level and the variability of the unemployment rate
in several ways. Unemployment beneﬁts are a typical example. Welfare beneﬁts have also
been used in some countries to remove from the labour force workers with low productivity or
employedinrestructuringﬁrms. Certainlyaveryrelevanteffectisthroughpublicemployment:
public sector employment is less affected than private sector employment by economic
downturns; the higher the level of public employment, the lower the effect of an exogenous
shock on the overall unemployment rate
17. As we have seen, the level of public employment
has been higher and growing more rapidly in countries with centralized wage bargaining.
To test model (2) I use data from the OECD 2001 Economic Outlook panel data
set. To start with, I consider the same time period (1962-1985) and the same grouping by
centralization of the seventeen countries as the one used by CD. Since for all variables I take
means over six-year periods starting from 1962 and up to 1985, in this section I consider four
six-year periods.
As a measure of public intervention in the economy I consider both the level of
Government Current Disbursement (YPG ) and the level of expenditure for Government
results.
16 Iw o u l dl i k et op o i n to u tt h a t-a s s u m i n gm o d e l( 2 )-Id on o tm e a nt oa s s u m et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nX causes
an increase in DUNR. I simply assume a linear conditional expectation function E(DUNR/DC,X) and try to
get unbiased estimates of h γ and h δ.
17 Evidence of the fact that employment changes in the private sector are more strongly correlated with cycli-
cal movements in the economy than is the case for public sector employment is reported by Freeman (1987) for
the United States and by Blank (1993) for the United States and the UK. These authors claim that the lower de-
gree of cyclicality of public sector employment may reﬂect either the fact that the demand for public sector output
is less sensitive to business cycle ﬂuctuations or that governments choose to smooth employment ﬂuctuations to
achieve welfare or macroeconomic policy objectives.18
Consumption Wages (CGW).
18 This last variable records the level of expenditure on
public employment as a percentage of GDP, while Current Disbursement sum up all current
expenditures including expenditure on public employment, social expenditures and interest
payments as a percentage of GDP. I obtain the same qualitative results when I consider Current
Disbursement excluding Gross Government Interest Payments.
It is likely that both Current Disbursement and Government Consumption Wages
are not exogenous to the change in the economic environment (and, in particular, in the
unemployment rate). Current Disbursement includes expenditure for unemployment policies
thatautomatically grow with theunemploymentrate. Moreover, as I haveargued, governments
often increase expenditure and/or public employment to mitigate the effects of a downturn. In
order to control for endogeneity I use an Instrumental Variable approach.
A proper instrument has to be correlated with YPGor CGW but not with the error term.
Two IV candidates are Government Consumption Excluding Wages (CGNW) and Subsidies
paid by the Government (TSUB)
19: they are part of Current Disbursement (YPG )a n d
thereforeought to becorrelatedwith it; they arealsocorrelatedwith GovernmentConsumption
Wages (CGW), asthemaincomponentsofpublicexpendituregenerallytendtomovetogether.
As potential instruments I also consider the lagged values of both endogenous variables,
LY PG and LCGW. Table 3 reports the correlation coefﬁcients between the endogenous
variables and the instruments. From the Table it emerges that the correlations between
CGNW, TSUB and the endogenous variables are in the range 0.36-0.76; the correlations
are higher when considering the lagged endogenous variables.
As for the instruments’ exogeneity, the lagged endogenous variable are exogenous
by deﬁnition. Government Consumption Excluding Wages (CGNW) and Subsidies paid
18 Thelevel and the dynamics of GovernmentConsumption Wagescan beaffected by thedifferent deﬁnitions
of public sector across time and countries: for example, in countries where a signiﬁcant part of hospitals and/or
schools are private - or even if they are publicly owned, but are classiﬁed outside the general government because
they are privately managed - the costs borne by the government (as salaries) may be classiﬁed in the budget
accounts under other categories (such as social payments). Therefore, it is important to consider a variable which
includes all social payments, such as Current Disbursement.
19 Government Consumption Excluding Wages (CGNW) includes: intermediate goods used in the produc-
tion of public goods and services, transfers in kind to the household sector (i.e. pharmaceuticals) and depreciation
allowances. Subsidies(TSUB) include all grantson currentaccount made bythegovernment to privateﬁrmsand
public corporations; these grants are often made to compensate ﬁrms for operating losses due to the government’s
policies to maintain prices at a level below production costs. All automatic and non-automatic unemployment
beneﬁts are not included in Subsidies (TSUB) but in Social Beneﬁts paid by the Government (SSPG).19
by the Government (TSUB) should be only weakly dependent on the unemployment
rate. In fact, Government Consumption Excluding Wages includes mainly intermediate
consumption by general government and expenditure for pharmaceuticals; Subsidies paid
by the Government does not include unemployment-related expenditure but mainly grants to
industries to compensate them for the cost of government imposed price controls.
Overall, as I will show below (see Table 6), the results of the instrumental variable
regressions are intuitive: except for the CGW variable on the sample period 1962-2000, the
bias goes in the direction of increasing the OLS coefﬁcient of government spending.
4. Results
In this section I will ﬁrst replicate CD’s results and then test model (2). Table 2 reports
the results of the OLS regressions of the change in the unemployment rate (DUNR)o nt h eC D
measure of centralization (1=Centralized, 2=Intermediate, 3= Decentralized) and its square
for the periods 1962-1985, 1985-2000 and 1962-2000. Whether the coefﬁcient on the squared
term is signiﬁcant or not (and negative) provides a direct test for the hump-shape hypothesis.
The ﬁrst column of the Table (sample 1962-1985) shows that the degree of centralization
is signiﬁcant; the negative coefﬁcient on the degree of centralization squared indicates that
indeed there is a hump-shaped relationship between the change in the unemployment rate and
the degree of centralization.
As argued above, the effect of the degree of centralization on the unemployment rate
dynamics must be assessed controlling for the role of the government. Table 5 reports
mean levels over the years 1962-67 and mean growth rates over the period 1962-1985
by centralization of Current Disbursement (YPG ) and Consumption Wages (CGW)a sa
percentage of GDP. The Table shows that the degree of centralization is highly correlated
with the growth rate of expenditures over the sample period and that it is also correlated, to
some extent, with the level of government expenditure at the beginning of the sample period.
The Table reports also the mean level and the mean growth rates by centralization of Current
Disbursement (YPG ) and of Consumption Wages (CGW) instrumented with the two sets
of instruments considered.
20 Using the instrumented measures, mean Current Disbursement
20 The results of ﬁrst stage regressions are reported in Table 4.20
(YPG ) as a percentage of GDP at the beginning of the sample (1962-67 mean) is 0.305 for
centralized, 0.289 for intermediate and 0.279 for decentralized countries; there is no such
pattern for the instrumented measure of the government wage bill. The evidence on growth
rates is much stronger: taking ﬁrst stage results using CGNW and TSUBas instruments, the
average yearly growth rate over the sample period for Current Disbursement as a percentage
of GDP is 2.1%, 1.7% and 1.2% respectively for centralized, intermediate and decentralized
countries; the corresponding ﬁgures for Consumption Wages are 1.7%, 1.3% and 0.9%; the
differencein growthratesbetweencentralizedandintermediatecountries isgreaterwhenusing
the lagged dependent variables as instruments.
To assess the correlation between the growth in current expenditures and the change
in the unemployment rate I regress DUNR on centralization dummies and the chosen
measures of government intervention as in (2). In Table 6 I present results of both OLS
and IV regressions. As for the sample period 1962-1985, Table 6 shows that in fact the
correlation between centralization and unemployment rate is mainly captured by the measures
of government intervention and not by the centralization variables.
5. Extending the sample to the ’90s
In this section I discuss the results obtained by extending the sample up to the year 2000.
In orderto capturethe changesinthe degree of centralizationover time, I use the centralization
index reported by EMS (1998), which is based on OECD data. The EMS index is the most
updated one I could ﬁnd and, for most countries, gives information on the year a given country
moved from one degree of centralization to a different degree. I will also discuss the results
using the degree of centralization by country reported by OECD 1997 for the three years 1980,
1990 and 1994.
The third column of Table 2 shows the results of the OLS regression of the change in
the unemployment rate on the degree of centralization for the extended sample. The hump
shape is apparently robust to the extension of the data to the year 2000. However, when the
sample is restricted to the period 1980-2000 (second column of Table 2) no signiﬁcant relation
exists. Moreover, using the information on the degree of centralization reported by the OECD21
(1997), on the sample 1962-2000 the coefﬁcient of the degree of centralization squared is only
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The test of model (2) is reported in Table 6. The correlation between changes in
unemployment and centralization vanishes (as in the smaller sample) when introducing the
measures of government spending. In the longer sample, however, the overall ﬁt of the model
is much worse; in particular, all the coefﬁcients of the government intervention variables
are not signiﬁcant. This is due to the fact that, after the mid ’80s, the differences in public
employment and expenditure trends across groups of countries characterized by different
degreesofcentralizationhavebeenlimited(seeFigure2), whilethebehaviorofunemployment
has been very different across countries and more volatile than in the previous sample period
(see Figure 1).
6. Extensions
6.1 Playing with the indexes
Ihavealready used threedifferent indexes ofcentralization (CD, OECD1997 and EMS).
However, Flanagan (1999) suggests using a measure of bargaining coordination (instead of a
composite measure of bargaining level and coordination). The main difference between the
two measures regards Japan. Japan is usually classiﬁed as decentralized (or intermediate)
based on measures of both centralization and coordination; it is classiﬁed as centralized
based on the sole coordination index. In Japan wage bargaining takes place at company level
(therefore very decentralized), but it is usually highly coordinated across ﬁrms and sectors.
I repeated the analysis with the coordination index reported by Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta (1998) - see Table 1 last column. The evidence in favour of the hump-shape
hypothesis on the sample 1962-1985 is now signiﬁcant only at the 6% (the t statistic on
the coefﬁcient of centralization squared is equal to 1.930). In this case, too, this evidence
evaporates when controlling for public sector intervention. First stage regressions show a very
good ﬁt: in particular, the coefﬁcients on coordination and coordination squared are now more
signiﬁcant than when using the centralization index. When restricting the sample to the period
1980-2000, there is no evidence in favour of the hump-shape theory.22
6.2 Multiple tiers of bargaining and the role of non-union sectors in centralized economies
In centralized economies a second level of negotiations often exists (at the industry
or plant level) to give an operative content to the guidelines of national agreements. These
negotiations often introduce wage drifts that can partly neutralize the wage restraint efforts of
centralized bargaining. The literature on the subject, mainly on Scandinavian data, shows
that lower tiers of bargaining do not usually completely offset the effect of centralized
negotiations. This may be due to the high fraction of public employees in Scandinavian
countries, together with the fact that wage drifts are presumably smaller for public employees
than for private sector employees. Similarly, non-union sectors might reduce the correlation
between bargaining structure and unemployment dynamics: in an environment where there is
a signiﬁcant component of the labour force which is not unionized, even centralized unions
may not internalize the effects of wage increases, while ﬁrms may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to pass on
pay increases to consumers even if the bargaining takes place at the country or sectorial level.
However, ontopofthefactthatisverydifﬁculttohavedetaileddataontheseinstitutional
elements, it must be noted that the OECD (Job Studies 1995-1997) acknowledges that features
other than the level of bargaining and the degree of coordination among unions and employer
associations, such as multiple bargaining levels and union density (that is, the fraction of
trade union members out of all wage and salary earners), are less relevant for the bargaining
outcomes. The possibility of more than one bargaining level tends to shift the structure of
wage bargaining to a more decentralized one.
Finally, the fact that in some countries union density is decreasing has recently raised
some doubts about the capacity of unions to affect the bargaining outcomes in those countries.
However, the OECD reckons that union density has a limited role, since in many European
countries the degree of coverage (that is the degree of extension of collective agreements to
non-union members) remains very high.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper I have reviewed the empirical content of the hump-shape hypothesis
introduced by Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), which states that countries with highly centralized
and decentralized wage bargaining processes have a superior performance in terms of23
unemployment than intermediate ones. The objective of the paper has been to show that the
effect of centralization on unemployment depends heavily on the existing positive correlation
between public expenditures (and public employment) and centralization. To this end, I
have regressed the changes in the unemployment rate on indexes of centralization including
measures of government intervention in the economy; in order to overcome the endogeneity of
these measures, I have followed a two stage IV estimation. The results show that the claimed
superiority of centralized wage negotiations during the ’60s and the ’70s rests on the strong
growth of the public sector in centralized economies. During the second part of the ’80s and
the ’90s the hump-shaped relation between centralization and unemployment vanished.
Is this evidence consistent with the theoretical framework that CD proposed to explain
the hump-shape hypothesis? There are several reasons why the CD framework (discussed
in Section 2) is not easily extendable to public employment. Gregory and Borland (1999)
show that the empirical literature on the public sector labour market ﬁnds: i) a negative wage
elasticity of employment for most categories of labour in the public sector; ii) that the main
effect of unions on public sector employment is to increase the employment level; iii) that
union effects on employment are likely to operate through a (positive) demand shift effect
and that this effect is larger where strong forms of union representation exist. Therefore, as
far as the public sector is concerned, more centralization in wage bargaining leads to higher
employment mainly through political inﬂuence on government choices (more than through
wage moderation).
Even if one is willing to believe that the expansion of public employment in centralized
countries over the period 1960-80 was the result of the forces described by CD (essentially
wage moderation), their framework can not explain why the correlation between centralization
and labour market performance vanished starting in the ’80s, when the expansion of the public
sector in centralized countries started to slow down.
On these issues further research is needed. The analysis presented shows that, in order
to assess the effect of wage bargaining institutions on the dynamics of the unemployment
rate there is a clear need to get a better understanding of the determinants of public sector
employment levels and of the functioning of public sector wage negotiation.Appendix: Data description
Current Disbursement as a percentage of GDP (YPG )i sd e ﬁned as the GDP percentage
of the sum of: Government Consumption, excluding wages (CGNW); Government
Consumption, wages (CGW); Property Income paid by the Government (YPEPG );
Subsidies(TSUB); SocialBeneﬁtspaidby theGovernment(SSPG); OtherCurrent Transfers
paid by the Government (TRPG).
Change in mean Unemployment Rate (DUNR)i sd e ﬁned as the absolute change in the
means of the Unemployment Rate (UNR) taken over six-year periods starting from 1962.
Sample 1962 to 1985
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
UNR 67 3.44 2.66 0.00 9.97
DUNR 50 1.46 1.45 -0.38 5.71
YPG 53 0.35 0.10 0.13 0.58
CGW 60 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.19
CGNW 56 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.14
TSUB 57 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05
Sample 1962 to 2000
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
UNR 118 5.02 3.30 0.00 15.09
DUNR 101 0.88 2.00 -3.38 10.41
YPG 101 0.39 0.10 0.13 0.62
CGW 108 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.19
CGNW 104 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.14

























































































































































Fig.3-Changes in employment rate by centralization
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0Table 1 – Centralization Indexes
Country Year CD (1988) OECD (1997) EMS (1998) EMS (1998)
Coordination
Austria 1980 1 1 1 1
1990 -- 1 1 1
1994 -- 1 1 1
Denmark 1980 1 1 1 1
1990 -- 2 1 1
1994 -- 2 1 1
Finland 1980 1 1 1 2
1990 -- 1 2 2
1994 -- 1 2 2
Norway 1980 1 1 1 1
1990 -- 1 1 1
1994 -- 1 1 1
Sweden 1980 1 1 1 1
1990 -- 1 2 3
1994 -- 2 2 2
Australia 1980 2 1 2 2
1990 -- 1 3 3
1994 -- 3 3 3
Belgium 1980 2 2 2 2
1990 -- 2 2 2
1994 -- 2 2 2
Germany 1980 2 1 1 1
1990 -- 1 1 1
1994 -- 1 1 1
Netherlands 1980 2 2 2 2
1990 -- 2 1 1
1994 -- 2 1 1
New Zealand 1980 2 3 2 3
1990 -- 3 2 3
1994 -- 3 3 3
Canada 1980 3 3 3 3
1990 -- 3 3 3
1994 -- 3 3 3
France 1980 3 3 2 2
1990 -- 2 2 2
1994 -- 2 2 2
Italy 1980 3 3 3 2
1990 -- 3 3 2
1994 -- 1 1 1
Japan 1980 3 2 3 1
1990 -- 2 3 1
1994 -- 2 3 1
Switzerland 1980 3 2 -- --
1990 -- 2 -- --
1994 -- 2 -- --
UK 1980 3 3 2 3
1990 -- 3 3 3
1994 -- 3 3 3
US 1980 3 3 3 3
1990 -- 3 3 3
1994 -- 3 3 3
Sources: Calmfors and Driffill, 1988 (CD); OECD Employment Outlook, 1997 (OECD); Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta, 1998 (EMS).Table 2 – CD results: OLS regressions*
Dependent















N. of observations 50 48 95
R
2 0.544 0.039 0.206
F statistic 0.000 0.405 0.000
* t statistics in parenthesis
Table 3 – Correlation coefficients between instruments and endogenous variables
     (variables expressed as % of GDP)
Sample 1962-1985
YPG CGW LYPG LCGW CGNW TSUB
YPG 1.00
CGW 0.77 1.00
LYPG 0.95 0.63 1.00
LCGW 0.78 0.91 0.73 1.00
CGNW 0.76 0.57 0.78 0.63 1.00
TSUB 0.48 0.36 0.44 0.32 0.07 1.00
Sample 1962-2000
YPG CGW LYPG LCGW CGNW TSUB
YPG 1.00
CGW 0.74 1.00
LYPG 0.89 0.54 1.00
LCGW 0.79 0.88 0.78 1.00
CGNW 0.66 0.37 0.64 0.47 1.00
TSUB 0.46 0.53 0.24 0.36 0.06 1.00Table 4 - First stage regressions*
Sample 1962-1985 Sample 1962-2000



































































N. of observations 53 39 53 39 101 85 101 85
R
2 0.984 0.995 0.967 0.994 0.975 0.992 0.970 0.993
Prob > F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* t statistics in parenthesis
Table 5 – Average level and average yearly growth rate, normal and instrumented values






YPG CGW YPG CGW YPG CGW
Centralized 27.6 9.6 30.5 9.9 -- --
62-67 average level Intermediate 27.5 8.5 28.9 10.2 -- --
Decentralized 25.3 9.3 27.9 9.4 -- --
Centralized 3.3 2.6 2.1 1.7 3.5 2.8
62-85 average growth rate Intermediate 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.3 2.7 2.6
Decentralized 2.6 1.2 1.2 0.9 2.3 1.3Table 6 - OLS ad IV regressions*
Sample 1962-1985 Sample 1962-2000
Dependent









YPG 5.898 5.441 4.568 1.067 0.302 1.215
(2.979) (2.364) (2.067) (0.461) (0.106) (0.506)
CGW 12.924 9.615 8.258 6.180 7.027 8.018
(1.957) (1.455) (1.201) (0.807) (0.892) (0.982)
Centralization -1.060 -0.281 -0.805 0.310 -0.350 0.606 0.876 0.608 1.300 0.355 0.753 0.151
(-1.044) (-0.271) (-0.700) (0.289) (-0.305) (0.534) (0.656) (0.488) (0.821) (0.272) (0.537) (0.111)
Centralization
squared 0.318 0.130 0.253 -0.044 0.128 -0.127 -0.280 -0.217 -0.393 -0.145 -0.238 -0.082
(1.123) (0.457) (0.795) (-0.148) (0.401) (-0.402) (-0.749) (-0.628) (-0.898) (-0.402) (-0.605) (-0.216)
N. of observations 41 47 41 41 39 39 89 95 89 89 85 85
R
2 0.671 0.605 0.647 0.637 0.649 0.621 0.182 0.211 0.180 0.186 0.228 0.179
Prob > F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
* t statistics in parenthesisReferences
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